In this paper, we propose the plausibility transformation method for translating Dempster-Shafer (D-S) belief function models to probability models, and describe some of its properties. There are many other transformation methods used in the literature for translating belief function models to probability models. We argue that the plausibility transformation method produces probability models that are consistent with D-S semantics of belief function models, and that, in some examples, the pignistic transformation method produces results that appear to be inconsistent with Dempster's rule of combination.
Introduction
Bayesian probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of belief functions are two distinct calculi for modeling and reasoning with knowledge about propositions in uncertain domains. Bayesian networks and Dempster-Shafer belief networks both provide graphical and numerical representations of uncertainty. While these calculi have important differences, their underlying structures have many significant similarities. In a recent paper [Cobb and Shenoy 2003a] , we argue that these two calculi have roughly the same expressive power. We say roughly since we don't have a metric to measure expressiveness exactly.
There are many different semantics of D-S belief functions, including multivalued mapping [Dempster 1966 ], random codes [Shafer 1987 ], transferable beliefs [Smets and Kennes 1994 ], probability of provability [Pearl 1988 ], and hints [Kohlas and Monney 1995] , which are compatible with Dempster's rule of combination. However, the semantics of belief functions as upper and lower probability bounds on some true but unknown probability function are incompatible with Dempster's rule [Walley 1987 ]. Also, Smets [2002] gives betting rates semantics for belief functions assuming that the pignistic transformation is the correct transformation. Since the pignistic transformation does not appear to be consistent with Dempster's rule 1 , these betting rates semantics may not be valid for D-S belief functions. In this paper, we are concerned with the D-S theory of belief functions with Dempster's rule of combination as the updating rule, and not with theories of upper and lower probabilities, nor with
Smets' transferable belief model with the pignistic rule. One benefit of studying probability functions derived from D-S belief functions is a clearer understanding of D-S belief function semantics.
In this paper, we propose a new method for translating a D-S belief function model to a Bayesian probability model. This is useful for several reasons. First, a large model of an uncertain domain may have some knowledge represented by belief functions, and some represented by probability functions. To reason with the entire model, one needs to either translate the belief functions to probability functions, or vice-versa. 1 In Section 4, we give an example and some arguments as to why the pignistic transformation is inconsistent with Dempster's rule of combination.
Second, although there are several proposals for decision-making using belief functions [e.g., Schmeidler 1989 , Jaffray 1989 , Strat 1990 , Yager 1992 , the theory of belief functions lacks a coherent decision theory to guide the choices of lotteries in which uncertainty is described by belief functions. One solution to this situation is to translate a belief function model to a probability model, and then use the Bayesian decision theory to make decisions. Smets [1990] has suggested this strategy be used by applying the so-called "pignistic" transformation method. We are concerned that the pignistic transformation method may not be consistent with
Dempster's rule of combination. One alternative is to use the plausibility transformation (in place of the pignistic transformation) for making decisions with belief functions. In some situations such as the Ellsberg paradox [Ellsberg 1961 ], decision making using the probability function derived using the plausibility transformation leads to outcomes that are at variance with empirical findings. The topic of normative or descriptive decision making with D-S belief functions is beyond the scope of this paper.
with D-S theory semantics could provide a probability function that can be construed as a "meaning" of the basic probability assignment.
Sixth, the literature on belief functions is replete with examples where it is suggested that belief function theory is more expressive than probability theory since a "corresponding" probability model using the pignistic transformation leads to non-intuitive results [see, e.g., Bogler 1987] . In these examples, if we use the plausibility transformation method to translate the belief function models, the two models-a belief function model and the corresponding probability model using the plausibility transformation-give the same qualitative results.
Seventh, a transformation method that is consistent with D-S belief function theory semantics will lead to a new method for building probabilistic models. One can use belief function semantics of distinct evidence (or no double-counting of uncertain knowledge [Shenoy 2005] ) to build belief function models and then use the transformation method to convert it to a probability model.
The main contributions of this paper are five theorems and three corollaries that describe some key properties of the plausibility transformation method. These properties allow an integration of Bayesian and D-S reasoning that takes advantage of the efficiency in computation and decision-making provided by Bayesian calculus while retaining the flexibility in modeling evidence that underlies D-S reasoning. These conclusions will lead to a greater understanding of the similarities between the two methods and allow belief function techniques to be used in probabilistic reasoning, and vice versa. We also discuss an example that questions the compatibility of the pignistic transformation method with Dempster's rule of combination.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation and definitions. Section 3 describes the plausibility transformation method for translating belief functions to probability functions. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper including one example that is used to raise the issue whether the pignistic transformation method is compatible with Dempster's rule of combination. In Section 5, we summarize and conclude. Proofs of all theorems are found in the Appendix. 
A probability potential P s for s is a function P s : Ω s → [0, 1]. We express our knowledge by probability potentials, which are combined to form the joint probability distribution, which is then marginalized to the variables of interest.
In order to define combination of probability functions, we first need a notation for the projection of states of a set of variables to a smaller set of variables. Combination. Combination in a Bayesian network involves "pointwise" multiplication of functions. Suppose P s is a probability potential for s and P t is a probability potential for t.
Then P s ⊗P t is a probability potential for s∪t defined as follows:
Marginalization. Let s\{X} denote the set-theoretic subtraction of the variable X from set s. Marginalization in a Bayesian network involves addition over the state space of the variables being eliminated. Suppose P s is a probability potential for s, and suppose X ∈ s. The marginal of P s for s\{X}, denoted by P s ↓(s\{X}) , is the probability potential for s\{X} defined as follows:
for all y ∈ Ω s\{X} .
Inference. The probability potentials specified in a probability model can be used to Usually, one is interested in the marginals of the joint posterior function for some variables of interest.
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions
Dempster - A bpa can also be stated in terms of a corresponding plausibility function or a belief function.
The plausibility function Pl corresponding to a bpa m for s is defined as Pl:
The belief function Bel corresponding to a bpa m for s is defined as Bel:
The valuation network (VN) graph defined by Shenoy [1992] 
for all non-empty z ⊆ Ω a∪b , where K is a normalization constant given by
Clearly, if the normalization constant is equal to zero, the combination is not defined, so the two bpa's are said to be not combinable. If the bpa's m A and m B are based on independent bodies of evidence, then m A ⊕m B represents the result of pooling these bodies of evidence. Shafer [1976] shows that Dempster's rule is commutative and associative, so the bpa's representing the evidence in the network of Figure 2 .2, for instance, could be combined in any order to yield the joint bpa.
Marginalization. Suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose t ⊂ s. The marginal of m for t, denoted by m ↓t , is the bpa for t defined as follows:
for each a ⊆ Ω t , where b ↓t denotes the subset of Ω t obtained by projecting each element of b to t.
Intuitively, marginalization corresponds to coarsening of knowledge.
Similar to the probabilistic case, we make inferences from a belief function model by computing the marginal of the joint belief function for variables of interest. All belief functions that constitute the belief function model must be independent.
The Plausibility Transformation Method
Our main goal in this section is to describe a new method for translating a belief function model to a corresponding probability function model. One method of achieving this is to translate each independent belief function in the belief function model to a corresponding probability function.
The collection of probability functions then constitutes a corresponding probability model.
Suppose m is a bpa for subset s. Let Pl m denote the plausibility function for s corresponding to bpa m. Let Pl_P m denote the probability function that is obtained from m using the plausibility transformation method. Pl_P m is defined as follows:
for all x ∈ Ω s , where K = Σ{Pl m ({x}) | x ∈ Ω s } is a normalization constant. We will refer to Pl_P m as the plausibility probability function corresponding to bpa m.
Other Transformation Methods. The most commonly used transformation method is the pignistic transformation method 3 defined as follows. Let BetP m denote the pignistic probability function for s corresponding to bpa m. Then,
for all x ∈ Ω s . Daniel [2003] has defined a host of other transformation methods.
Properties of the Plausibility Transformation
Haspert [2001] identifies the significance of the relationship between the D-S plausibility function and probability functions, noting that when multiple belief functions on the same domain are combined using Dempster's rule, the masses in the resulting bpa migrate to the outcome for which the product of the plausibility terms is the greatest. He presents heuristic arguments that indicate that the plausibility function can be used to link Bayesian and D-S reasoning. Giles [1982] was among the earliest to discuss decision making with plausibility functions. Appriou [1991] suggests selecting the hypothesis with the maximum plausibility in a decision-making context.
Dempster [1968] states that the upper probability bound (or plausibility) associated with a belief function is the appropriate likelihood function that contains all sample information.
Similarly, Halpern and Fagin [1992] observe that the plausibility function calculated from a given belief function behaves similarly to a likelihood function and can be used to update beliefs.
Given a set H consisting of basic hypotheses-one of which is true-and another set Ob [Shafer 1976 ] that Pl A | b is given by:
for all a ∈ Ω B . Comparing (4.1) and (4.2) suggests that the correspondence between a belief function and probability function is via the plausibility function. This correspondence alone does not justify the plausibility transformation, because (4.2) could be restated in terms of the Bel function. To provide further justification for the plausibility transformation, we will state the following theorem from Voorbraak [1989] . 
Theorem 4.1 is significant for several reasons. First, we often create a belief function model, compute the joint belief function, and then translate the joint belief function to a probability function for the reasons described in Section 1. If the transformation used is the plausibility transformation, Theorem 4.1 tells us that we can escape the computational complexity of Dempster's rule and use Bayes rule instead to obtain the same result.
Second, it is often easy to construct belief function models where it is intractable to compute the joint belief function using Dempster's rule. Theorem 4.1 tells us that we can translate the belief function model to a probability model and achieve a more tractable result in probability theory by using Bayes rule.
Third, a qualitative aspect of uncertain knowledge is idempotency. Generally, most uncertain knowledge is non-idempotent. However, some knowledge is idempotent. Fourth, if we use the plausibility transformation for decision making purposes, then Theorem 4.1 tells us that a two-level decision-making scheme such as the one proposed by Smets [1990] (with the pignistic transformation) is unnecessary. Since we get the same results whether we use Dempster's rule with belief functions or Bayes rule with probability functions that are translations of the belief functions, we might as well work with the probability functions (from a computational perspective). This does not mean we don't need the D-S theory of belief functions as the different semantics of this theory provides several methods for building models that are otherwise not available in other calculi. To answer this question, consider the following hypothetical scenario consisting only of bpa m and Dempster's rule of combination. We are interested in the true state of variable H. We start with complete ignorance. Starting from day 1, each day we receive an independent piece of evidence that is represented by bpa m described above. Thus, e.g., on day 2, our total belief is described by m 2 = m⊕m which is as follows: m for H is given by m 3 , and so on. Table 1 gives the details of some of these functions. Suppose one subscribes to Smets's decision theory based on the pignistic transformation.
On day 1, our belief for H is given by m, and as per BetP m , we are willing to bet for h 1 against h 2 with odds 15:1. On day 2, our total belief for H is given by m 2 = m⊕m, and as per BetP m 2 we are willing to bet for h 1 against h 2 with odds 4.33:1. One can ask: Why did the odds for h 1 against h 2 diminish on day 2 from 15:1 to 4.33:1? If the evidence on day 1 supported h 1 against h 2 , and a similar evidence was received on day 2, the odds for h 1 against h 2 should have increased and not decreased. On day 3, as per BetP m 3, we are willing to bet on h 1 against h 2 with odds approx.
1.4:1. On day 4, as per BetP m 4, we are now willing to bet for h 2 against h 1 with odds approx.
2.06:1, and so on. Dempster's rule of combination tells us that each successive evidence supports h 2 against h 1 . This is inconsistent with BetP m . Thus, we question whether the pignistic transformation method is incompatible with Dempster's rule.
On the other hand, suppose we subscribe to decision making with the plausibility transformation method. On day 1, our belief for H is given by m, and as per Pl_P m , we are willing to bet for h 2 against h 1 with odds 2.33:1. On day 2, our total belief for H is given by m 2 = m⊕m, and as per Pl_P m 2 we are willing to bet for h 2 against h 1 with odds 2. This example also demonstrates why the result stated in Theorem 4.1 is fundamental for any method that proposes to translate a D-S belief function model to a corresponding probability model for any of the reasons given in Section 1 including decision-making. ■
To further demonstrate that the plausibility transformation is consistent with Dempster's rule of combination, we consider another asymptotic property of this transformation. In probability theory, assuming there is a unique state x that is most probable according to a probability function P, x has the property that Lim n→∞ P n (x) = 1, and Lim n→∞ P n (y) = 0 for all y ∈ Ω s \{x}, where P n denotes P⊗…⊗P (n times). Belief functions have a similar property, as stated in the following theorem. In Theorem 4.3 stated earlier, the belief function m was assumed to have a unique most plausible state x. Now suppose we have a non-singleton subset of most plausible states. In probability theory, if P is such that t ⊆ Ω s is a subset of most probable states, and P ∞ denotes In general, computation of marginals in a D-S belief network is accomplished with local computation using two operations: combination and marginalization [Shenoy and Shafer 1990] .
The plausibility transformation is not invariant with respect to marginalization. Formally, suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose t ⊂ s. Then (Pl_P m ) ↓t is not always equal to Pl_P m ↓t. This is graphically shown in Figure 4 .2. 
Computing the marginal of the bpa for G, then using the plausibility transformation to calculate Finally, the following theorem allows us to find the plausibility function for a marginal bpa without having to calculate the marginal bpa.
Theorem 4.8. Suppose m is a bpa for s and t ⊆ s. Then,
for all a ⊆ Ω t .
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Conclusions and Summary
The main goal of this paper has been to propose the plausibility transformation method for translating belief function models to probability models, and describe some of its properties. In particular, we have demonstrated that it results in probability models that are invariant with respect to combination, and consequently retains the D-S semantics of belief functions whose primary updating rule is Dempster's rule of combination. However, the plausibility transformation is not invariant with respect to marginalization.
There are a number of other transformation methods proposed in the literature. One of them is the pignistic transformation method. For some examples, the pignistic transformation method results in probability models that are qualitatively different from the probability models produced by the plausibility transformation method. We question whether the pignistic transformation is compatible with Dempster's rule of combination. A comparison of these two methods with several examples is described in Cobb and Shenoy [2003c] . 
